Cost or Cause
The military budget that was intended
for shore based missile and rocket system was realigned towards deferment per
approval of President Aquino based on the recommendation of his military top
brass. Accordingly, the said budget that amounts to PHP 6.5 billion will be use instead
to procure body armors and helmets. The military had justified the need for those
equipments to protect its personnel from the increasing use of Improvised
Explosive Device (IED) by the insurgents in Mindanao and
elsewhere where the New Peoples Army is currently operating. That decision had caused a
stir in the social media that in summary had mirrored frustration and anger particularly among
the followers of the AFP modernization. Beyond the action and reaction however, the meaning of the announcement was more telling. The AFP and the
current administration, maybe unwittingly, is telling the Filipino people, China, its allies and the interested world that its political will won't go beyond diplomatic and legal means, and
consequently there is no strategic alternative to defend and preserve its territory
other than the total reliance to a favorable judgment of the UN tribunal. The reality is that a favorable resolution is neither a means to recover the lost territory
nor a deterrence to preserve the rest. Unbelievably, the Philippine government and its
military leadership had bared the contents of their pockets when it discarded an essential element of psychological warfare, that is,
to keep the adversary guessing, in constant wonder and uncertainty. Effectively, they had given up any possibility of the Philippines engaging China in combat by denying themselves the means to do so. The diversion of funds earmarked for external defense expenditure in favor of internal security requirements would in a way is like sending a message that the Chinese invasion is low in the priority list. This is despite of China ’s
continues expansion and thievery at the Philippine waters .
They have expose their (misplaced) priorities, amid the crisis that befell the Philippine fishing industry when hundreds, if not thousands of
tons of marine life is extracted from the Philippine waters daily; the thousands of dislocated and confuse Filipino families who rely on fishing for survival; the environmental destruction and the resultant pollution being swept by the tide to Philippine
shores; the sea denial, experienced not only by the military
but also of the civilian populace as well; the prospect of those reclaimed
islands becoming an untouchable and un-guardable border, a refuge and haven for covert operators, a new backdoor for Chinese fake rice and medicines, not to
mention illegal drugs and who knows what else. All these are to be relegated to the background until they actually transpire.
What about the psychological
impact of that decision on moral... of the Filipinos themselves? Will it run counter to
the ongoing government campaign that seek for the people’s support in the fight
for the West Philippine Sea ? Is it not, that the judgement to postpone to whenever, the acquisition of tools to defend and preserve territorial integrity assumes incompatibility with their present effort to foster awareness and to garner public support? What sort of empathy and sacrifice can be expected from the people, when the leadership
themselves had telegraph that feeling of defeatism and surrender by effectively downsizing the China issue?
So then... what on earth for, are the
hoolaballo called “balikatans”, and those other exercises with US ,
Australia , Korea
and Japan ? How can the Philippines
be of use as an ally? Can one consider the Philippines
a reliable and worthy ally given its current actuations, inactions and bear market
like behavior? Is everything just for a show, or a mere facade to accommodate
foreign military bases at Philippine cost? Will it be more appropriate to refer to the Philippines as a host rather than an ally? Will it be hard to believe that the Philippine intent is to acquire platforms, but never weaponry, and hence, it may not really be deserving of those military
equipments being donated or loaned-out by its allies, considering that indirectly
it is in admission that external defense is not its priority? A more practical question would be, how can an ally defend another that doesn’t want to defend itself?
Responsibility, commitment and conviction would merely regard cost
as an element of cause. Cost is almost always dictated by the cause and not the other way around. If one really believes in a cause, cost
would be a relevant, but never a lone deciding factor. Measures will be boldly introduced to surmount the
cost. In the case of the Philippine leadership, their judgment is seemed to be
based substantially and purely on cost, and hence is self-limiting. Cost needs to be contrasted against benefit and among other factors. Their priorities
are determined primarily by cost and not by the urgency of the cause. Reaction
is favored over pro-action. One may never really understand why a duly constituted
government would ignore an invasion, and by its acts or the lack of it, would actually regard the same as subpar to the relatively contained internal subversion, unless, they themselves had ceased to believe that
there is a worthy cause to fight for at all cost.
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