Interoperability to Nothing?

Up until now, the Philippine Navy is way far behind its south-east Asian counterpart in as far as naval assets are concerned. Currently, it is merely operating three Ex-US coastguard cutters armed with 76 mm cannons and two cargo vessels from Indonesia which were recently added to handle its transport needs, it goes without saying, that the Philippine Navy is unarmed and ill-equipped by world standard. What does that mean? It means, and barring political reasons, no matter what it does, at its present and near future state, it will not be able to fulfill its constitutional mandate, of protecting the Philippine sovereign territory and its sovereign rights. Although two frigates are under construction at the behest of the Philippine's Department of National Defense, its specifications, particularly its weapons payload will make it just a bit more threatening than the Ex-US coastguard cutters, but not enough to instill fear in the heart of any foreign adversary. It will be lightly armed and less stealthy, and hence, in all probability, it will not be able to sustain itself in a full-pledged sea combat. Since there will be a maximum of two on the pipeline for this frigate type, its deficiency will never be countermanded by numbers.

The sophistication and advancement in missile technology seem to have rendered the surface ships in near obsolescence. Supersonic and long-range missiles with state of the art guidance system could wipe out a fleet of naval vessels within a short time. Surface ship defenses may prove inadequate if guided missiles are fired with multiple rockets as decoys, such that, all the ship air defenses are expended, to the point that there is nothing left to protect it from the main barrage of more accurate and powerful anti-ship missiles. Probably at this point, that the Philippine Department of National Defense and the Philippine Navy have come to the realization that stealth is the key to survival in a sea battle. After all, they cannot shoot you if they cannot see you. Hence, maybe this was the precursor towards the decision to shift the acquisition priority, from frigate to submarine. A logical decision, in as far as this forum is concerned.

The Philippine Armed Forces are contemplating to acquire submarine to imbue credence to its tarnished defensive capabilities. In fact, the DND Secretary recently visited Russia to check on Russian weapons that include the Kilo class submarine. It runs on diesel and electric motors. The latter is what makes it stealthy since it reduces noise to the point of undetectability. Submarines are naturally stealthy especially when submerged, unlike destroyers, frigates, and corvettes that can easily be tracked by satellite. The submarine epitomizes the enduring and protracted success of guerilla warfare. It can hit and run with minimal trace of its presence. It can deliver special operation troops to conduct covert mission and lay in wait till its over, again without being detected. Submarines can provide low key monitoring of contested areas. It can operate independently. In toto, a submarine can provide sea control, sea denial, and power projection. It is a potent tool in sea warfare that will require expensive and complicated defense system on the part of its adversary. The submarine is the choice of lesser navies to counter a superior force. It is a means to equalize and level the playing field in sea warfare. The submarine is for the serious navy. A squadron of submarine is and will always be a worthwhile investment for defense and national security.

The opportunity to acquire submarine is now presenting itself, with Russia willing to provide a soft loan for the Philippines to own the Kilo-class submarine, which could be the project 636.3, an advanced version of the Kilo class, that is also known as the “Black Hole” in the west. The government of the Philippines and its defense establishment should seriously consider the Kilo class for the following reasons; it may be procured via soft loan, meaning the terms of payment will be manageable for the Philippines.; the amount that could be saved can be used to acquire the planned corvettes, or the Brahmos supersonic land-based missile, to complement the submarine project; the Kilo class is currently the least expensive but effective platform in the market at 200 to 250 million US Dollars a piece.

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Enter the United States, through the visiting undersecretary of defense, who recently, had issued a statement that was more of a reminder, and less of a warning, that the Philippine's plan to acquire military hardware from Russia would be unhealthy to US-Philippine alliance and diplomatic relation. Anothet issue raised by the good undersecretary is the absence of interoperability of Russian submarine with allied and coalition equipment. The Philippine president was quick to dismiss the US pronouncement and had questioned the United States authority to prevent the Philippines from acquiring submarines from Russia. This was quickly followed by a US offer to sell the F16v Block 70 fighter jets to the Philippines.

Now, let us try to view the foregoing at a closer perspective. The United States does not want its allies to procure big ticket items from Russia for two reasons; 1}It will violate US sanction/s against Russia. 2} Russian military equipment is not compatible with western military equipment and its interfaces like the Link 16. For the same reason, that the US is preventing Turkey {being a member of the NATO alliance} from acquiring S400 air defense system from Russia, the Philippines is likewise being dissuaded from making a similar acquisition. The United States expects its allies to align their policy with US laws and foreign policy by treating US enemies as its enemies. This expectation comes from US exceptionalism, which maybe recapitulated in the following phrases, ”You are my ally if you follow my lead, otherwise you are my enemy”, “ Either you are with me, or against me”. There is no neutral ground; no independent foreign policy; if an allied country's foreign policy opposes that of the US, the US policy should prevail and there goes your sovereign will, out of the window, a classic imperialist doctrine towards a subordinate and vassal state, that was glorified by the word "ally". If ever that the Philippine government should proceed to acquire Russian submarine, a similar sanction could be imposed against the Philippines. But let us take notice that sanctions are acts of war, a US sanction against the Philippines will technically be an act of war, that is hardly commensurate and brutally disproportional  with Philippine efforts to merely uplift its military capability based on its own defense doctrine and affordability level. A US sanction against the Philippines would truly undermine the US-Philippine relation, that could draw the Philippines farther away towards the Chinese and Russian lap.

On the issue of interoperability, the United States offer to sell F16V Block 70, amid the Philippines plan to procure submarine from Russia is seemingly an offer that is in lieu of,..., to possibly dictate the equipment that the Philippines should use, and consequently the doctrine it should adapt to defend itself, which by any means is conventional. Let us be reminded that US equipment is almost always used as a political leverage by the United States. Hence, the F16 being a US equipment is subject to layers of congressional and bureaucratic approval. Same could be true with spare parts and weaponry for the F16, it could be used to impose on and pressure the present and future government to adhere first with US policy. If such will be the case, independence will always be at stake.

The plan to procure submarine is indicative that the Philippine Navy is adapting the doctrine of asymmetric warfare at sea, which is unconventional. Hence, the issue of interoperability could become secondary. Foremost and more important is that the equipment that will support the doctrine so adapted is procured regardless of diplomatic consequence unless the same is expressly prohibited under the Mutual Defense Treaty. This will be the proof, that the present sovereign government has the strength to assert its political will and self-determination despite the pressure from a superpower. Moreover, let us be reminded of the inconvenient truth, that neither the US nor the UN had taken action to arrest China's advances at the South China Sea to the detriment of Philippine's interest and that of other claimants. The United States had failed to protect the Philippine's interest from the beginning to date, but it seek and demand policy alignment from its allies like the Philippines, to further its own interest through the  adaptation of US policy, which in this particular case is the Russian sanction. More so, the US has failed so far to reciprocate its prohibition, by providing a similar western alternative that will be in lieu of the Russian submarine, that is within the means of the Philippines to acquire. 

The reason for the non-procurement of the Russian submarine, if such will be the case, should be rested on a solid ground and not on the mud of persuasion laid by intimidation, threat or duress. It should be a decision that is the product of the sovereign will, and to the best interest of the country, first and foremost. The Philippines should not be dissuaded from procuring what it think is essential to support its doctrine. The choice would be logical, it is better to have something that lacks interoperability than nothing at all. The US position on interoperability issue and the US policy vs. Russia is relatively alien to the Philippines and adapting them would be akin to the acceptance that it is indeed a vassal state of the US. It is now or never, the advantage that a submarine could bring to a small navy is incalculable. It could be a game changer for the Philippines that is nearing the losing end.