How do you defend an archipelago ?

The failure to seriously addressed this question through doctrinal integration and strategy development may be fatal to any effort of protecting an archipelagic country like the Philippines. 

The Philippines is a nation separated by bodies of water. In an event of invasion or foreign aggression, how will it be possible to maintain each island free from the occupation of a foreign power? We have to bear in mind that each island is strategic in its own right, but physically isolated from the rest, a plus factor for the invading forces and a minus for the defenders. The aggressor need not worry about its flanks since there are only but bodies of water surrounding it. A concentrated superior and brute force can be employed one island at a time till the defenders are cornered like rats. After which, the beleaguered and defeated island will be used as a base or staging area to attack the next, and so on. The lessons of Bataan and Corregidor should somehow exemplify this point. Even Gen. McArthur himself was aware and had exploited this weakness in the liberation of the Pacific islands from the Japanese by deliberately concentrating the American assault one island at a time. Imagine that there is a continuity of land that bridges Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao. Meaning people and vehicles can cross end to end unimpeded by bodies of water. Will the Bataan defenders be telling a different story? Not sure, but there could be a much larger room for maneuver, escape, evasion, reinforcement, resupply, regrouping, consolidation, and repositioning of forces if the land feature is there. The aggressors may lose the advantage of force concentration. They may have to spread themselves thinly, and the fight could go on to the weariness of the attacking forces. Now, picture this flexibility in archipelagic setting and how the same can be achieved.

Another point of value is logistics and supply to the defending forces. During the Vietnam war, the Ho Chi Minh (HCM)) trail was the lifeline that supported the Vietcongs and North Vietnamese Army(NVA) in South Vietnam with men, provisions and war materials. It had extended from the north, through the boundaries of Laos and Cambodia, crawling under three layers of the jungle canopy, towards South Vietnam. The Americans had dropped two million tons of bombs along that trail but to no avail. The supply line was disrupted many many times. A number were killed and substantial equipment was destroyed. However, it has never been shutdown. The question is why did the Americans pour so many resources to destroy the trail, not to mention the use of defoliant chemical called agent orange, that equally victimized their own troops? And why did the North Vietnamese made so much sacrifice to maintain the trail? You see, without logistics and supply, none of any contending forces can sustain a fight. There is a limit to human endurance no matter how spirited. The HCM trail traversed a  continuos land feature, that is not available to an archipelagic country like the Philippines. How then can a military strategist achieve a similar objective like that which was provided by the HCM trail, that is, to sustain its forces, like the vessels that carry the blood that nourishes a body? An ancillary question now arises,  how do you maintain a lifeline to forces defending an island/s within an archipelago? The foregoing questions could induce a blank stare, even from the eyes of a seasoned military strategist. At best, we can let them answer those questions. But did the question even crossed their mind? It is a fact, that up to now, the Philippine military is having a hard time supplying a handful of troops stationed on a dilapidated ship at the Ayungin shoal. 

The ongoing procurement of the Armed Forces of the Philippines(AFP) provides a clue to the current doctrine and strategy they may have been adopting. The slow and "patingi-tingi", (piecemeal) acquisition of air, naval and land assets by the Philippine government displayed a lingering indifference to the current situation, particularly in the South China Sea. One can't help but think, that It is just for a show. To project a semblance of modernity at par with its neighbors. But nothing can be farther from the truth. While its neighbors are in the rush to arm or rearm itself with relevant equipment, the Philippines is quite comfortable with its dilly-dally attitude, so it appears. Seemingly, the proponents of AFP modernization is unassertive, even at the idea of providing itself with real weapons both on quantitative and qualitative terms. Weapons that could make a difference. It seems that its procurement is aimed only at achieving situational awareness, naval presence, and internal defense to say the least. Even its upcoming frigates are relatively ill-armed compared to other navies. It may be under the delusion that since it does not seek war, the same will not come. It is obvious that its reliance on the United States is total and absolute, hardly an ideal resolution for a state that professes itself to be traversing an independent foreign policy. Again, the questions should give the strategist and war planners a sort of something to think about, if that animal even exists.

But then again and nevertheless, this venue has a few pennies for thought. Unlike some 50 years ago, the advancement in technology could now enable the current war planner to execute its strategy even in a difficult scenario of defending naturally isolated territories. On the question of defending an island or group of islands, the key is maintaining a "reciprocating forces". Meaning, an adjacent island/s should be strategically armed not only to defend itself but also to defend neighboring islands in as far as technology would permit. Each island will become a killing zone, a trap... aimed at any invading forces. How can this be made possible by technology? The answer is through the use of long-range land-attack cruise missiles, long-range multiple launches guided rocket artillery system and long-range anti-ship cruise missiles. A selected island may maintain a sufficient number of this equipment. in mobile form, all to be employed in the case of invasion. The idea is to saturate the enemy forces from various direction particularly from their unprotected flanks which are the sea, and inner peripheral waters. The flow of men and materials must be continuos towards the island under siege. To do this, the mobility of personnel may be enhanced by providing airborne units with transport aircraft on a larger island/s. Marines should likewise be expanded and distributed to suitable island/s with their landing crafts. The Philippines should invest heavily not only on attack submarine, but also on transport submarines, and lots of them. Submarines that can transport materials in large quantities. The submarine should mimic the HCM trail of North Vietnam. That is, it can procure supplies from bases outside the conflict zone and return undetected thereby evading naval blockades. Submarines may allow seamless troop insertion from one island to another, whenever they are needed. 

If the Philippines is indeed serious in defending its territory and its sovereign rights, it has to step up, by frontloading the procurement of relevant missiles and submarines. It has to invigorate its airborne and marine units in numbers and distribute them accordingly. It has to procure a large number of medium air and naval transport equipment to ensure mobility. It has to start building an inventory of food rations that can withstand time and minimal preparation. It should maintain an adequate ready reserve force on each island that is sufficiently trained, and disciplined enough to hold the line, when the “shit hits the fan”, so to speak.

It will not hurt if the Philippine military planners will adopt the views of Israel's military strategist. Israel is a staunch advocate of active defense. They design, build and procure their weapons to support a strategy. The strategy dictates what weapons are needed. The Philippines seemingly is on the reverse side. The weapons it procures is dictating its strategy, an imposed attitude similar to that of ragtag guerillas and freedom fighters. 

There may be less costly and more practicable alternatives other than those mentioned here, that military planner may find, and able to exploit. However, certain things should remain, and stay constant in the equation. The synergy of forces must be maintained, and the strategic value of each island must be recognized, as an advantage, and be utilized to the fullest for the survival and preservation of the whole archipelago.