Mao Tse Tung and his Protracted War, An Adaptation
The following is an adaptation of an excerpt from
the series of lectures delivered by Mao Tse Tung in 1938 at the Yenan
Association for the Study of War of Resistance Against Japan at the height of
the second Sino-Japanese War from 1937-1945 at a city in North Eastern China. The lecture seemed to have
included a question and answer segment where Mao Tse Tung had laid out his
strategy to counter the Japanese occupation of China
until the former’s defeat at the end of the 2nd world war. It was a war fought by China as an underdog against the Japanese atrocious expansionism. The irony of that event in history is that China has now assumed the role of the Japanese conquistadors which it had fought during that war.
The semi-literal translation presumably from Chinese into English is maintained in this adaptation; the word China is replaced by the word Philippines; while Japan is referred to as China instead. Some places and events deemed inapplicable were excluded, and in some section the words ASEAN or Southeast Asia were inserted to effect the sought adaptation.
The semi-literal translation presumably from Chinese into English is maintained in this adaptation; the word China is replaced by the word Philippines; while Japan is referred to as China instead. Some places and events deemed inapplicable were excluded, and in some section the words ASEAN or Southeast Asia were inserted to effect the sought adaptation.
Under what conditions do you
think Philippines
can defeat and destroy the forces of China?
Answer: Three conditions are
required:
First, the establishment of an
anti-Chinese united front in Southeast Asia;
Second, the formation of an
international anti-Chinese united front;
Third, the rise of the
revolutionary movement of the people in China
and the Chinese colonies.
From the standpoint of the
Filipino people, the unity of the people of Philippines
and Southeast Asia is the most
important of the three conditions.
Question: How long do you think
such a war would last?
Answer: That depends on the strength
of Philippine’s and ASEAN anti-Chinese united front and many other conditioning
factors involving Philippines
and China.
That is to say, apart from Philippines own strength, which is the main thing,
international help to Philippines and the help rendered by the revolution in China
are also important. If ASEAN's
anti-china united front is greatly expanded and effectively organized
horizontally and vertically, if the necessary help is given to Philippines by
those governments and peoples which recognize the China’s imperialist menace to
their own interests and if revolution comes quickly in China, the war will
speedily be brought to an end and Philippines will speedily win victory. If
these conditions are not realized quickly, the war will be prolonged. But in
the end, just the same, China
will certainly be defeated and Philippines
will certainly be victorious. Only the sacrifices will be great and there will
be a very painful period.
Question: What is your opinion of
the probable course of development of such a war, politically and militarily?
Answer: China's continental
policy is already fixed, and those who think they can halt the Chinese advance
by making compromises with China at the expense of more Philippine and East and
South East Asian territory and sovereign rights are indulging in mere fantasy. We
definitely know that the …. South China Sea
and East China Sea are already
included in the continental programme of Chinese imperialism. Moreover, China
wants to occupy ……… in order to cut off other countries from …… and monopolize
the …… Pacific. This is China's
maritime policy. In such a period, China
will undoubtedly be in an extremely difficult position. But the majority of the Filipino people believe that such difficulties can be overcome; only the rich in
the big port cities are defeatists because they are afraid of losing their
property. Many people think it would be impossible for Philippines
to continue the war, once her coastline is blockaded by China.
This is nonsense. To refute them we need only cite the war history of the……,
Philippine position is much superior to that of the China
……..South China Sea. Philippines is a ……
country, and even if China should succeed in occupying a section of south China
sea with as many as …….., we would still be far from defeated. We would still
have ample strength to fight against China,
while the Chinese would have to fight defensive battles in their rear
throughout the war. The heterogeneity and uneven development of Philippine
economy are rather advantageous in the war of resistance. For example, to sever
west Philippine Sea from the rest of Philippines
would definitely not be as disastrous to Philippines
as would be the severance of New York
from the rest of the United States.
Even if China
blockades the Philippine coastline, it is impossible for her? to blockade
Philippine’s ………. Thus, once more the central point of the problem is the unity
of the entire Filipino people and the building up of a nation-wide anti-Chinese
front. This is what we have long been advocating.
Question: If the war drags on for
a long time and China
is not completely defeated, would the Philippines
agree to the negotiation of a peace with China
and recognize her rule in South China Sea?
Answer: No. Like the people of
the whole country, the Philippines
will not allow China
to retain an inch of Philippine territory.
Question: What, in your opinion,
should be the main strategy and tactics to be followed in this "war of
liberation"?
Answer: Our strategy should be to
employ our main forces to operate over an extended and fluid front. To achieve
success, the Filipinos troops must conduct their warfare with a high degree of
mobility on extensive battlefields, making swift advances and withdrawals,
swift concentrations and dispersals. This means large-scale mobile warfare, and
not positional warfare depending exclusively on defence works with deep
trenches, high fortresses and successive rows of defensive positions. It does
not mean the abandonment of all the vital strategic points, which should be
defended by positional warfare as long as profitable. But the pivotal strategy
must be mobile warfare. Positional warfare is also necessary, but strategically
it is auxiliary and secondary. Geographically the theatre of the war is so vast
that it is possible for us to conduct mobile warfare most effectively. In the
face of the vigorous actions of our forces, the Chinese army will have to be
cautious. Its war-machine is ponderous and slow-moving, with limited
efficiency. If we concentrate our forces on a narrow front for a defensive war
of attrition, we would be throwing away the advantages of our geography and
economic organization and repeating the mistake of Abyssinia.
In the early period of the war, we must avoid any major decisive battles, and
must first employ mobile warfare gradually to break the morale and combat
effectiveness of the enemy troops.
Besides employing trained armies
to carry on mobile warfare, we must organize great numbers of guerrilla units
among the peasants. One should know that the anti-Chinese volunteer units in
the three northeastern provinces are only a minor demonstration of the latent
power of resistance that can be mobilized from the peasants of the whole
country. The Filipino peasants have very great latent power; properly organized
and directed, they can keep the Chinese army busy twenty-four hours a day and
worry it to death. It must be remembered that the war will be fought in
Philippines, that is to say, the Chinese will be entirely surrounded by the hostile
Philippines and South East Asian and Japanese people, it will be forced to move in all its provisions and guard
them, it must use large numbers of troops to protect its lines of
communications and constantly guard against attacks and it needs large forces to
garrison ……..as well.
In the course of the war, Philippines
will be able to capture many Chinese and
seize many weapons and munitions with which to arm herself; at the same time Philippines
will win foreign aid to reinforce the equipment of her troops gradually.
Therefore Philippines
will be able to conduct positional warfare in the latter period of the war and
make positional attacks on the Chinese-occupied areas. Thus China's
economy will crack under the strain of Philippines
long resistance and the morale of the Chinese forces will break under the trial
of innumerable battles. On the Philippine side, however, the growing latent
power of resistance will be constantly brought into play and large numbers of
revolutionary people will be pouring into the front lines to fight for their
freedom. The combination of all these and other factors will enable us to make
the final and decisive attacks on the fortifications and bases in the Chinese-occupied
areas and drive the Chinese forces of aggression out of Philippines.
What led to the 2nd Sino-Japanese war was Japan's hegemonic intent and its hunger for new resources. These were motivations that had predicated those horrific events and circumstances that necessarily must accompany its pursuit. These same motivations and intent are now propelling China to seek dominance. Its newly assumed role, from beleaguered to a belligerent is now being displayed and unfolding in the stage that is the South China Sea.
In the past, one event leads to another, and hence the relative outcome in the same and current scenario can be no different. The persistent variables in the power game are the
players, settings and technology, while the new variables factoring in is the extent of US
participation and the existence of weapons of mass destruction. If history will
revisit into reality, China
may experience a full dose of its own strategy, and may lead itself to face a protracted
war towards an outcome that can never be predicted.
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